Scalability: A communication perspective

French-Japanese Workshop on Blockchain technologies and application to digital trust

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Slides available on https://bramas.fr

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Who am I?

Associate Professor in Strasbourg, France

I work on Blockchain, BlockDAG

And also in distributed algorithms:

- mobile autonomous robots
- routing protocols
- dynamic graphs



Scalability ?

- Consensus protocol
- Storage
- Throughput
- Latency



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Two of my work on Scalability

- Consensus Protocol
- Throughput / Application



Scalability of the consensus protocol

Two main category of blockchains:

- permisionless (Bitcoin, ...):

PoW, Arbitrary number of participants, very slow

- permisionned, consortium (RedBelly, ...):

DBFT, limited number of validators, fast



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Main goal: replacing proof-of-work, to reduce energy consumption.



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Idea: use the interactions between the participants to elect the next block writer.



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Idea: use the interactions between the participants to elect the next block writer.

Current limitation: fixed set of participants, but can be very large.



The guided tour puzzle

Mehmud Abliz and Taieb Znati. *A Guided Tour Puzzle for Denial of Service Prevention*. In Proceedings of the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) 2009

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The guided tour puzzle

ICUBE

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The guided tour puzzle k servers i = H(c) mod k Recoma Server dient



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The guided tour puzzle

Recoma Server $(c_1 c_1, c_2, \dots, c_L)$ lient checks $c_{1} \stackrel{?}{=} H(c \parallel K_{i})$ $c_{1} \stackrel{?}{=} H(c_{1} \parallel K_{i})$ Resource



We consider a fixed set of participants P_{0} , P_{1} , ..., P_{n}

A participant ρ_{c} can perform a guided tour, with a seed derived from **its public key**



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A participant \int_{C}^{C} can perform a guided tour, with a seed derived from **its public key**



We consider a fixed set of participants P_{0} , P_{1} , ..., P_{k}

A participant ρ can perform a guided tour, with a seed derived from its public key and the Merkel tree root **and the hash of the previous block.**



We consider a fixed set of participants P_0 , P_1 , ..., P_{\sim}

How long is the tour?



We consider a fixed set of participants P_0 , P_1 , ..., P_{\sim}

What data do we ask participant to sign ?



We consider a fixed set of participants P_0 , P_1 , ..., P_{\sim}

How to tolerate crashes?



Properties:

Not parallelizable

Difficulty is adjustable

Crash-tolerant

Byzantine-tolerant

Protected against Selfish-mining



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c: sign; (Bper || P; || M) c, Bru, M Pi



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c: sign (Bper || Pi || M) c, Bru, M Pi

c' = sign; (Bper || P; || M/) c', Bprev, M' Pi



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L = rand (sign, (Bpru)) 1 adjustable.



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Proba (Zi Pi has a tour with correct nodes)



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Proba (not all node in a tom are Byzantine)

~____ 1



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to create a block, P: must send the previous Block



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Small message complexity



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Small message complexity

Each participant is
part of
$$\approx 20$$
 tours
but contribute 1 of the time.





Motivation: how to guarantee data transmissions between IoT devices using blockchain?



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Challenge: IoT devices generate a lot of data



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Challenge: IoT devices generate a lot of data

Idea: use off-chain transmission if possible



A centralized pub-sub protocol:





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Unidirectional off-chain data channel







The receiver has a proof of the origin of the data



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- The sender has a proof that the data is received



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- The sender can sell his data and be sure to be paid (In this case the buyer is sure to receive its data)



- The receiver has a proof of the origin of the data
- The sender has a proof that the data is received
- The sender can sell his data and be sure to be paid (In this case the buyer is sure to receive its data)
- Messages are sent off-chain, unless there is a problem (link failure or malicious behavior)



Conclusion

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Conclusion

2 examples to improve scalability in Blockchains

- Proof-of-interactions

Jean-Philippe Abegg, Quentin Bramas and Thomas Noël. Blockchain Using Proof-of-Interaction, Netys 2021

- Off-chain pub-sub protocol

Jean-Philippe Abegg, Quentin Bramas, Timothée Goubault de Brugière and Thomas Noël. Distributed Publish/Subscribe Protocol with Minimum Number of Encryption, ICDCN 2022



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Thank you

